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WAGNER V. CUTLER: NOVEL INTERPRETATION
OF A WARRANTY DEED
Margaret C. Hesse*
I. INTRODUCTION
Property conveyancing through the centuries has established
one function of warranty deeds: to warrant good, clear title to the
property conveyed by the deed. Recently, however, the Montana
Supreme Court, in Wagner v. Cutler,' capsized established prop-
erty law when it decided that an out-of-state statutory special war-
ranty deed warranted the good condition of the property. This
casenote analyzes the portion of the Montana Supreme Court's
opinion that discusses the interpretation of the special warranty
deed given by the grantor.
After reviewing the court's holding, this casenote focuses on
several points the court should have considered when determining
what the special warranty deed warranted. First, the word "war-
rant," when used in a conveyancing context, refers to a promise
that the title to the property is clear. Second, warranty deeds his-
torically warrant only the title to the property. At no time have
warranty deeds, in themselves, warranted the condition of the
property itself. Third, a special warranty deed merely limits a gen-
eral warranty deed to the acts of the conveyor. Fourth, the Utah
statute from which the special warranty deed in Wagner was de-
rived clearly elucidates the meaning of the deed. Last, warranty
deeds usually do not imply covenants of title unless the covenants
of title are statutorily defined.' After clarifying warranty deeds,
this casenote considers the effects of the decision on conveyancing
in Montana and provides guidelines for lawyers to follow to avoid
the snares baited by Wagner.
II. THE OPINION
A. The Facts and Procedure
In 1973, Earl Cutler (Cutler), an employee of the Church of
Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (LDS), hired several contrac-
* I would like to thank Professor Robert Natelson, School of Law, University of Mon-
tana, for his assistance in preparing this casenote. Any errors or omissions are my own.
1. 232 Mont. 332, 757 P.2d 779 (1988).
2. Common law warranties, such as the implied warranty of habitability, are not cove-
nants of title.
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tors to build a "Capp Home" on his large lot.3 When Cutler moved
into the house in 1975, he "experienced problems with the septic
system, the lawn sprinkler system, and flooding in the basement."4
LDS transferred Cutler in 1980 and, a year later, purchased
Cutler's home because he was unable to sell it.' After purchasing
the property, LDS immediately listed the vacant property with a
real estate agent. The listing agreement described the house as
only four years old and "well-built," with no major defects.' LDS's
real estate agent published the home in the local Multiple Listing
Service (MLS) advertisement using similar language.
7
Candace Wagner viewed the house several times with another
agent and liked it.' Wagner's agent represented the house as "'well
built' according to 'code'" and gave Wagner a document, claiming
that it represented the county's approval of the septic system.9
Wagner's agent also provided a copy of the MLS listing upon
which Wagner relied for details about the house.' ° The MLS listing
did not mention that the house was a Capp Home, and at no time
did anyone tell Wagner that the house was a Capp Home."
After agreeing upon the price, Wagner and LDS signed an ear-
nest money receipt containing these two clauses: (1) "Purchaser
agrees to accept property [and] appliances in 'as is' condition un-
less otherwise provided for . . ." and (2) "Purchaser enters into
this agreement in full reliance upon his independent investigation
and judgment."'2 The earnest money receipt also required LDS to
furnish Wagner with a warranty deed. LDS, however, added the
term "special" to the warranty deed requirement before signing
the earnest money receipt.' 3 When the sale closed, LDS furnished
3. Id. at 334, 757 P.2d at 780. Capp Homes was a subsidiary of Evans Products Com-
pany, which marketed a finish-it-yourself concept in house building. Capp Homes provided
the materials and a crew to frame the house on a foundation the owner provided. After
framing the house, Capp Homes had no further obligations. The owner or the owner's sub-
contractors installed wiring and plumbing, shingled the roof, insulated the attic and walls,
installed sheetrock, landscaped, etc. Advertisement, Capp Homes: Sharing Your Dreams for
Tomorrow (Copy on file at the office of the MONTANA LAW REVIEW).
4. WAGNER, 232 Mont. at 334, 757 P.2d at 780.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 334, 757 P.2d at 780-81.
7. Id. at 334, 757 P.2d at 781.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Respondent's Brief at 3, Wagner v. Cutler, 232 Mont. 332, 757 P.2d 779 (1988)(No.
87-230).
11. Wagner, 232 Mont. at 335, 757 P.2d at 781.
12. Id.
13. Respondent's Brief at 8, Wagner (No. 87-230).
[Vol. 51
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Wagner with the required special warranty deed for the property. 4
Soon after the closing, Wagner experienced problems with the
house, including a hazardous chimney, a broken sewage pump, an
unfinished basement, and a broken lawn-sprinkler system. 15 These
problems eventually caused Wagner to sue both Cutler and LDS to
recover damages for misrepresentation and violation of the seller's
(LDS's) duty to inspect and disclose defects."6
B. The Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's de-
cision awarding Wagner $15,203.19 in damages. 7 First, the court
held that Wagner reasonably relied on LDS's representations as to
the condition of the house. Furthermore, LDS did not use reasona-
ble care in disclosing the true condition of the house to her. 8 The
court reasoned that the "independent investigation" and "as is"
clauses of the earnest money receipt did not prevent Wagner from
justifiably relying on LDS's misrepresentations. 9 Thus, the court
allowed Wagner to recover for latent defects. However, because she
should have discovered several of the defects during her inspec-
tions of the house, the court did not allow recovery for any noticea-
ble defects.2 ° The court could have ended the opinion at that point
and would have achieved the correct result. Instead, the court
added a second line of reasoning; it interpreted the special war-
ranty deed given by LDS to Wagner as a warranty of the condition
of the property.2 This analysis of the special warranty deed mud-
dled centuries of property law and may subject conveyancing in
Montana to volatility for years to come.
14. Wagner, 232 Mont. at 337, 757 P.2d at 782.
15. Id. at 335-36, 757 P.2d at 781.
16. Id. at 335, 757 P.2d at 781. Wagner also sued on a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. The district court dismissed this cause and also dismissed Cutler from the
case. Id. The court may have dismissed the breach of the implied warranty of habitability
action because no single builder was per se responsible for the construction of the house.
See supra note 3. Capp Homes had merely framed the house and provided the other build-
ing materials. Cutler, together with friends and subcontractors, had finished the home. Re-
spondent's Brief at 1-2, Wagner (No. 87-230). Additionally, Capp Homes was no longer in
business at the time of the 1986 trial in district court. Interview with Ron Ramsey, former
employee of Capp Homes, in Missoula, MT (Oct. 19, 1989).
17. Wagner, 232 Mont. at 334, 757 P.2d at 781.
18. Id. at 336, 757 P.2d at 782-83.
19. Id. at 336, 757 P.2d at 782 (citing Parkhill v. Fuselier, __ Mont ..... 632
P.2d 1132, 1135 (1981)).
20. Id. at 336-37, 757 P.2d at 782.
21. Id. at 337, 757 P.2d at 782.
1990]
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
When construing the special warranty deed LDS gave to Wag-
ner, the Montana Supreme Court applied contract-interpretation
standards without considering a deed's significance as a conveyanc-
ing document. A Montana statute provides that "[a] voluntary
transfer [of title to real property] is an executed contract subject
to all rules of law concerning contracts in general, except that a
consideration is not necessary to its validity. ' 22 This statute sup-
ports the contract interpretation of LDS's special warranty deed;
however, the court failed to interpret the deed correctly because it
misconstrued the word "warrant."
When reviewing the sale documents, the Montana Supreme
Court noted that LDS had drafted them and stated, "In the plain
language of the contractual clause,2" LDS warranted the house.
Having done so, LDS contractually bound itself to the veracity of
the warrant. '24 The court supported its reasoning with two con-
tract-interpretation statutes.25 The first statute provides: "The lan-
guage of a contract is to govern its interpretation if the language is
clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity. 2' The other
statute stipulates that any uncertainty in the language of a con-
tract should be interpreted against the promisor.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-502 (1989).
23. The special warranty deed LDS used to convey the property stated, in part,
"Grantor, of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, hereby conveys and warrants, against all acts
of itself, and none other, to all claiming by, through or under it to CANDACE A. WAG-
NER, Grantee .... the following parcel ...." Wagner, 232 Mont. at 337, 757 P.2d at 782.
24. Id. (relying upon MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-206 (1987)).
25. Id. The court used contract-interpretation statutes selectively to interpret the spe-
cial warranty deed. Apparently it did not consider MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED § 28-3-301
(1989) that states that the mutual intention of the parties "as it existed at the time of
contracting" must be given full effect when interpreting a contract. In the earnest money
receipt, LDS promised a "special" warranty deed to execute the agreement. Wagner sought
a document evidencing the transaction, but nowhere in the briefs filed on appeal does it
appear that Wagner intended the document to warrant the condition of the property. This
intent is buttressed by her signing of the earnest money receipt with its "as is" and "inde-
pendent investigation" clauses. Those clauses purported to provide that Wagner knew she
was purchasing a used home with all its flaws.
Furthermore, if Wagner did not understand the significance of the warranty deed, she
had a duty to inquire about its purpose. As one court stated, "Inexperience alone ... does
not excuse a landowner from the responsibility of reading an instrument before [she] signs
it, and if [she] does not understand its provisions, making inquiry of the person who drafted
the instrument or having it checked by [her] own counsel." Superior Oil Co. v. Vanderhoof,
297 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (D. Mont. 1969).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-401 (1989).
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-206 (1989):
In cases of uncertainty not removed by parts 1 through 5 of this chapter, the
language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who
caused the uncertainty to exist. The promisor is presumed to be such party, ex-
4
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Because the "language of a contract is to govern its interpreta-
tion if the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an
absurdity, '.. the court looked at the plain language of the special
warranty deed. However, the court did not consider the unique re-
lationship of a deed to property conveyancing. Particular words in
a deed have become operative words in the sense that they must be
present in the deed to make it comply with established property
law.29 "Grant" and "warrant" are such operative words.30 A con-
tract interpretation of a deed is not always correct because such an
interpretation may conflict with the operative words upon which
conveyancing relies. Moreover, statutes exist in many states that
import certain meanings into deeds from the presence of particular
words.31 A strict contract interpretation of a deed containing statu-
torily defined language, therefore, would also be incorrect. The
deed actually means what the statute says it means; often this
meaning is something other than what the plain language of the
deed indicates.
In Wagner, the court's contract interpretation of the deed
hinged on the significance of the term "warrant." In a contract
context, warrant means to "promise that a certain fact or state of
facts, in relation to the subject-matter, is, or shall be, as it is repre-
sented to be."31 2 In a conveyance context, warrant means "to assure
the title to property sold."3 "Warrant," then, has two distinct
meanings, depending upon the context in which the word is used.
In Wagner, the court's interpretation of the deed centered on the
definition of "warrant" as used in a contract setting. Because the
deed used the word "warrant," the court interpreted the deed to
mean that LDS assured the condition of the property. Specifically,
the court determined that the seller certified the house to be in
good condition.
The deed, however, was a document of conveyance; therefore,
the court should have interpreted "warrant" in that context.34 The
court should have recognized that LDS promised that Wagner's ti-
tle to the property was good and that her possession would be un-
cept that in the case of a contract between a public officer or body, as such, and a
private party, it is presumed that all uncertainty was caused by the private party.
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-401 (1989).
29. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.44 (1952).
30. Id.
31. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1421 (5th ed. 1979).
33. Id.
34. See supra text accompanying note 31.
1990]
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disturbed.3 5 Had the court construed "warrant" in a conveyancing
context, it would not have found that the special warranty deed
warranted the condition of the property.
The court also relied on a second statute requiring that a court
interpret any uncertainty in the language of a contract most
strongly against the party causing such uncertainty.36 In Wagner,
because LDS was the promisor, the court stated, "Any uncertainty
over 'what was warranted' in the deed should be interpreted most
strongly against [LDS] . . . ."3 In actuality, LDS's special war-
ranty deed should not have created any uncertainty because a war-
ranty deed, by definition, warrants only good, clear title to the
property.3 Thus, "warrant," as used by LDS, meant to assure only
good, clear title, and the conclusion that the deed provided by
LDS warranted the condition of the property was erroneous.
IV. FACTORS THE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED
Instead of relying on only the two contract-interpretation stat-
utes, the court should have considered the historical background of
warranty deeds, the different types of warranty deeds, statutorily
created deeds, and case law clarifying warranty deeds. If the court
had done so, it would have reached a different conclusion regarding
the special warranty deed.
A. History of Warranty Deeds
Warranty of title dates back to the days of feudal incidents in
England.3 9 If the title to a vassal's fee were disputed, the lord who
originally presented that fee had a duty either to defend the vas-
sal's fee or, if the vassal were evicted, to give the vassal a "feud" of
comparable value.4 0 This warranty of title was a natural incident of
tenure; therefore, no express covenant was necessary.4 1 English
"covenants for title'"' replaced the common law warranty during
35. The court reached the proper result regarding the latent defects in its interpreta-
tion of the earnest money receipt. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. If the
court had correctly interpreted the special warranty deed as one which warranted the title
to the property, the court would not have altered its result.
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-206 (1989).
37. Wagner v. Cutler, 232 Mont. 332, 337, 757 P.2d 779, 782 (1988).
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (5th ed. 1979).




42. Six "covenants for title" are recognized: (1) covenant of seizin, (2) covenant of
right to convey, (3) covenant of quiet enjoyment, (4) covenant against encumbrances, (5)
[Vol. 51
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the latter half of the seventeenth century.43 When the English set-
tlers immigrated to America, they brought with them these cove-
nants for title. Eventually, the covenant of warranty became the
most commonly used and relied upon covenant in the United
States.43 At present, a warranty deed typically contains a covenant
of warranty, irrespective of whether it contains any other cove-
nants of title."
The covenant of warranty promises that the grantor will de-
fend the grantee's title to the property against any other person
claiming the same title.'7 The covenant of warranty "runs with the
land," in that the original grantor's promise to defend the title also
protects a remote grantee."' The grantee may sue the grantor
under the covenant of title when actually or constructively evicted
by a holder of paramount title.49 Upon notice of the eviction, the
grantor must defend the grantee's title and, failing that, must pay
the grantee damages if the title is not as the seller represented
such title in the deed.50 Damages may include the cost of curing
the title or the amount of reduction in value-limited by the origi-
nal purchase price-of the property attributable to the defective
title plus attorneys' fees and, in some cases, interest.5
1
Examples of claims against title which might give rise to an
action include actions brought because an encumbrance or lien ex-
ists against the property,52 an easement not specified in the deed
exists,5" or a paramount title to the property exists.54 All actions
are claims against the title to the property, not claims against the
condition of the property itself. The historical development of war-
ranty deeds demonstrates that the covenant of warranty protects
covenant for further assurance, and (6) covenant of warranty. Id. at 11-12.
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 203.
47. Id. at 224.
48. Id. at 335. See also Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, this volume
parts III & IV.
49. W. RAWLE, supra note 39, at 216.
50. See generally, J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 648-49 (2d ed. 1988).
51. J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 302 (3d ed. 1989).
52. See, e.g., Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866 (UtAh 1979); Mack-Welling Lumber and
Supply Co. v. Bedore, 191 Kan. 88, 379 P.2d 545 (1963); Schuster v. Northern Co., 127
Mont. 39, 257 P.2d 249 (1953).
53. See, e.g., Brown v. Baker, 67 Or. App. 283, 677 P.2d 741 (1984); Bank of Alaska v.
Ashland, 128 Wash. 572, 224 P. 7 (1924).
54. See, e.g., Chaney v. Haeder, 90 Or. App. 321, 752 P.2d 854 (1988); St. Paul Title
Ins. Corp. v. Owen, 452 So. 2d 482 (Ala. 19,84); Foley v. Smith, 14 Wash. App. 285, 539 P.2d
874 (1975); Bernklau v. Stevens, 150 Colo. 187, 371 P.2d 765 (1962).
1990]
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the buyer of real property only from claims against the title to the
property.
B. General or Special Warranty Deeds
A warranty deed may be general or special.55 In a general war-
ranty deed, the grantor provides a general covenant of warranty
that warrants the grantee's title against all persons. 6 In a special
warranty deed, the grantor provides a special or limited covenant
of warranty that warrants title only against claims held "by,
through, or under" the grantor, or against encumbrances made by
the grantor.57 "A special warranty deed therefore protects the
grantee against a claim under a title from [the grantor], but not
against a claim under a title against, or superior to, [the gran-
tor]."58 A special warranty deed does not warrant title against all
persons; it protects the grantee from claims resulting only from the
grantor's acts.
LDS converted a Utah warranty deed into a special warranty
deed by inserting the words "against all acts of itself, and none
other. '59 When LDS converted a general warranty deed into a spe-
cial warranty deed, the warranties in the conveyance remained
warranties of title only. LDS's special warranty deed should have
protected the buyer only from claims against her title resulting
from acts of the seller.
C. LDS's Special Warranty Deed
LDS, which is principally located in Utah, provided Wagner
with a special warranty deed6" derived from a Utah statutory short
form warranty deed that reads:
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(hereby insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby conveys
55. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 646 (2d ed. 1988); See also W. RAWLE, supra
note 39, at 224-25.
56. See, e.g., W. Rawle, supra note 39, at 224-25.
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (5th ed. 1979). The deed that LDS gave to Wagner
was a special warranty deed.
58. Central Life Assurance Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wash. 2d 632, 646, 126 P.2d 757,
763 (1942)(emphasis supplied by court)(Defendant purchased property from plaintiff and
received a special warranty deed. Defendant discovered title defects that were not the plain-
tiff's fault. Plaintiff brought this action for forfeiture of the contract after the defendant
defaulted on payments.).
59. Wagner v. Cutler, 232 Mont. 332, 337, 757 P.2d 779, 782 (1988).
60. See supra note 23.
[Vol. 51
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss1/7
WAGNER v. CUTLER
and warrants to (insert name), grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in County, Utah, to wit:
(here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this - day of
., 19 - .
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, [the grantee's]
heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together with
all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging,
with covenants from the grantor, [the grantor's] heirs and per-
sonal representatives, that [the grantor] is lawfully seised of the
premises; that [the grantor] has good right to convey the same;
that [the grantor] guarantees the grantee, [the grantee's] heirs
and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are
free from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, [the grantor's]
heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and de-
fend the title thereof in the grantee, [the grantee's] heirs and as-
signs against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed following the
description of the land.'
LDS used the Utah short-form deed as it appears in the statute
with one change. LDS changed the general warranty deed into a
special warranty deed by adding the words "against all acts of it-
self, and none other" after the word "warrants.""2
In using this statutory short-form warranty deed, LDS ex-
pected certain results. LDS expected the special warranty deed to
warrant only the title to the real property against claims arising
from LDS's own acts. LDS's prior conduct and previous cases in-
terpreting the statutorily defined deed support LDS's expecta-
tions.6 3 LDS had used the statutory short-form deed in conveying
property throughout the United States64 and expected it to war-
rant only the title to the real property. In addition, the Supreme
Court of Utah, when construing this statutory short-form deed,
stated, "Warranties, other than the five embraced in a statutory
warranty deed, should be stated in a deed with clarity. 6 5 Thus, if
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-12 (1986)(emphasis added).
62. Wagner, 232 Mont. at 337, 757 P.2d at 782.
63. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
64. LDS used special warranty deeds like the one in Wagner to convey property all
over the United States and was quite familiar with the form. Respondent's Brief at 20,
Wagner v. Cutler, 232 Mont. 332, 757 P.2d 779 (1988)(No. 87-230).
65. Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 284, 373 P.2d 382, 386 (1962)(Plaintiffs bought lots
in an unapproved subdivision, believing it was approved. The plaintiffs later could not resell
1990]
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LDS had intended to warrant the condition of the property, LDS
would have done so expressly.
Conveyancers throughout the country depend on the same cer-
tainty upon which LDS relied. To enforce such certainty, however,
a deed must receive the same interpretation in one state as in an-
other. Obviously, when one state chooses or is forced to interpret
an out-of-state deed according to its own methods, conflicts may
occur. An example illustrates the difficulties that may arise:
X, a resident of State A, conveys property in State A to Y, a
resident of State B. Y, in turn, conveys the property to Z with a
statutory form warranty deed from State B. If problems result
with the property between Y and Z, State A has jurisdiction over
the dispute, yet the deed from State B would still control the
transaction.
Because citizens of the United States frequently move from
state to state, predicaments similar to those posed in the example
commonly arise. Under such circumstances, an out-of-state deed
often may cause confusion when interpreted in another state. This
problem occurs so frequently that the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws addresses it.66 Often these choice-of-law questions
focus on whether a court should imply covenants of title from
"special words in the deed [such] as 'grant, bargain, sell and
convey.' ",67
D. Express or Implied Covenants of Title
As the Utah statutory form deed demonstrated,68 covenants of
title in a deed may be either implied or express. 69 Historically
the property because potential buyers could not secure building permits. The plaintiffs sued
the original grantors for recovery under the theory that, by using the word "lot," the de-
fendants warranted that the properties were part of an approved subdivision.).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 190 (1969) states:
The contractual duties imposed upon the parties to a deed of transfer of an inter-
est in land are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties, by the local law of the state where the land is situated unless, with respect
to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship ... to
the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will
be applied.
67. Id. at § 190 comment b.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The words "convey and warrant" in the
Utah statutory form deed imply five covenants of title.
69. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.124 (1952). Note that this casenote refers only
to implied covenants of title, not to implied warranties, such as the implied warranty of
habitability. The Utah statutory warranty deed is a prime example of a deed with implied
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there has been an aversion toward implied covenants of title.70
However, many states have enacted statutes providing that partic-
ular words shall imply covenants of title in conveyances. 71 The two
most common statutory phrases which imply covenants of title in a
conveyance are "grant" 72 and "convey and warrant. '73 Generally,
when the word "grant" implies covenants of title, it implies only
two covenants of title: the covenant of right to convey and the cov-
enant against encumbrances.' Contrast that with the covenants of
title implied by the word "warrant." "Warrant" may imply all six
covenants of title; however, the word "warrant" invariably implies
the covenant of warranty.7 The applicable statutes dictate the cor-
70. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.124 (1952). A number of states have enacted
statutes stating that no covenants or warranties of title may be implied in a conveyance of
real property. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-61 (1982); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-115
(1988); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 251 (McKinney 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.140 (1983)(no
covenants implied except by other statutory provisions); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 9 (1975);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 706.10(6)(West 1981).
71. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.124 (1952).
72. "Grant" may be used alone or in combination (such as "grant, bargain and sell")
depending on the statute enacted in the particular state. See ALA. CODE § 35-4-271
(1975)(grant, bargain, sell or any of them); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-435 (1956)(grant or
convey); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-102 (1987) (grant, bargain and sell); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1113
(West 1982) (grant); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 121 (1974)(grant and convey); GUAM CIV.
CODE § 1113 (1970) (grant); IDAHO CODE § 55-612 (1988)(grant); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-41
(1972)(grant, bargain, sell); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.420 (Vernon 1986)(grant, bargain, and
sell); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-304 (1989)(grant); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.170 (1987)(grant,
bargain and sell); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-19 (1978)(grant); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 4, 8
(Purdon 1955)(grant and convey, and grant, bargain, sell, respectively); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 43-25-10 (1983)(grant); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.023 (Vernon 1984)(grant or
convey).
Because in so many states "grant" implies covenants of title, other states have passed
statutes which specifically state that the word "grant" does not imply covenants of title. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 771 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:24 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-32 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5302.03 (Anderson 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-7 (1956).
73. Some states interpret the word "warrant" alone in the same manner as other
states interpret "convey and warrant." See ALASKA STAT. § 34.15.030 (1985)(conveys and
warrants); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-113 (1973)(and warrant(s) the title); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
47-36(e)(1989)(with warranty covenants); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 689.02 to .03 (West Supp.
1989)(fully warrant the title); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 8 (Smith-Hurd 1969)(conveys and
warrants); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-2-12 (Burns 1980)(conveys and warrants); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-2203 (1983)(conveys and warrants); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.030 (Baldwin 1979)(war-
rant); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.571 (Callaghan 1982)(conveys and warrants); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 507.07 (West 1947)(conveys and warrants); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-33 (1972)(warrant); OR.
REV. STAT. § 93.850 (1983)(conveys and warrants); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 5 (Purdon
1955)(warrant generally); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-25-5 to -6 (1983) (conveys and
warrants); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-12 (1986)(conveys and warrants); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-
67, -70 (1986)(covenants, with... warranty, respectively); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.030
(1966)(conveys and warrants); WYo. STAT. §§ 34-2-102 to -103 (1977)(conveys and warrants).
74. See statutes cited supra note 72.
75. See statutes cited supra note 73. See also supra note 46.
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rect interpretation of the words.
In addition to enacting statutes implying covenants of title as
a result of the use of a word, some states have enacted statutes
providing a form for conveyancers to follow when conveying prop-
erty by warranty deed.76 These forms may or may not contain
words which imply covenants of title. Many statutory form deeds
contain the word "covenants,"' 77 while others merely provide a gen-
eral form."
In Wagner, the court construed a statutory form deed that
should have implied covenants of title from the words "convey and
warrant." Because the parties did not refer to the Utah statute,79
the court did not recognize that the deed implied specific cove-
nants of title.80 If, however, the deed had contained only the word
"grant," the court would have recognized it as a Montana statutory
grant deed. The Montana grant deed statutorily implies two cove-
nants of title: the covenant of right to convey and the covenant
against encumbrances.81
A Montana conveyancer using a Montana statutory grant deed
expects certain results. Similarly, a Utah conveyancer expects cer-
tain results when using a Utah statutory warranty deed. For exam-
ple, if A conveyed real property to B using a Montana statutory
76. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 648 (2d ed. 1988); see also statutes cited
infra notes 77-78.
77. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-36(c) to -36(d)(1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §
775(1) (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183, § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1987)(referring to Act of Apr. 18,
1912, ch. 502 § 2, 1971 Mass. Acts 423, § 1, reprinted in MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 183 app. at
144 (Law. Co-op. 1987)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.27 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:4-1 to -
2 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1-37, -38, -44 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5302.05
to .08 (Anderson 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-11-12, -15 (1956).
78. See ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-402 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 121 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.02 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 8 (Smith-Hurd
1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.19 (West 1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.571 (Callaghan 1982);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.07 (West 1947); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 40 (West 1986); OR. REV.
STAT. § 93.850 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-7-10, -20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 43-25-5 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-103 (1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
5.022 (Vernon 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-12 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.02.030
(1966); WYO. STAT. § 34-2-102 (1977).
79. Surprisingly, neither of the briefs submitted upon appeal by either party men-
tioned that the special warranty deed was a Utah statutory form deed.
80. The counsel for LDS should have argued that Utah law governed the statutory
form deed by referring to the statute as a special matter in LDS's pleadings. This reference
would have forced the court to give credence to the Utah statute. MONT. R. Civ. P. 9(d).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-304 (1989). The first covenant promises that the grantor
previously has not "conveyed the same estate or any right, title or interest" to it to any
other person. The second covenant promises that the estate, at the time of conveyance, is
free from encumbrances made "by the grantor or any person claiming under him." Because
the Montana grant deed does not contain the covenant of warranty, it is not a warranty
deed. 12
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grant deed, A would be conveying the property and would also be
giving B two covenants of title: the covenant of right to convey and
the covenant against encumbrances. The expectations of A are
merely to convey the property and to give the two covenants of
title implied in the statute, not to warrant the condition of the
property. Moreover, although the idea that a grant deed warrants
the condition of the property may seem far-fetched, such a theory
has been litigated. 2
A California court held that a deed based on an identical
"grant" statute"3 does not imply a warranty of the condition of the
land, but implies only covenants of title. 4 Quoting Williston on
Contracts, the court stated that "there can be no warranty of qual-
ity or condition implied in the sale of real estate . . . . 5 The
Montana grant deed similarly should not warrant the condition of
the property; it should convey the property and provide only the
two covenants of title. 6
E. Interpretation of Warranty Deeds in Montana
The Montana Supreme Court defined a covenant of warranty
in Capital Hill Shopping Center,- Associates v. Miles..8  The court
stated, "A covenant of warranty is for the purpose of indemnifying
the purchaser against a loss or injury [the purchaser] may sustain
by reason of a defect in the vendor's title."88 In that case, the court
interpreted a conveyancing document which contained a section
82. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
83. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1113 (West 1982). Montana adopted California's statute verba-
tim. Presently, this provision is codified as MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-304 (1989).
84. Gustafson v. Dunham, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d at -, 22 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163
(1962)(Purchasers of a home located on a lot which contained uncompacted fill dirt sued for
damages in a breach-of-warranty action after the fill dirt settled, damaging the home.).
85. Gustafson at -, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (quoting 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926 (1936)).
86. When the legislators adopted much of the comprehensive codification of the Field
Code in 1895, they adopted a provision for warranty of quality in sales of personal property.
MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED § 30-11-215 (1989) provides that a general warranty extends to
latent defects in personal property. This section positively shows that the legislators knew
how to codify a provision to warrant latent defects in real property if they were so inclined;
however, they failed to do so. As the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggests,
the express mention of warranty of quality of personal property would seem to exclude a
similar warranty of quality of real property.
87. 174 Mont. 222, 570 P.2d 295 (1977)(Defendant sold a shopping center to plaintiff.
Prior to the sale, defendant made an exclusive lease with Brown; however, defendant did
not disclose the existence of the lease to plaintiff at the time of the sale. Plaintiff success-
fully sued defendant for violation of the warranty provisions of the sale agreement.).
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entitled "Warranties. ' 9
The court construed a warranty deed that also contained the
word "grant" in Schuster v. Northern Co.90 The court decided that
the two covenants of title implied from the word "grant" and the
additional covenant of warranty expressed in the warranty deed
were the only promises made to the buyer of the real property.'
Instead of relying on contract interpretation, the Montana Su-
preme Court should have relied on precedent case law to interpret
LDS's special warranty deed. Moreover, if the court had followed
Schuster and Capital Hill Shopping Center, Associates, the court
would have arrived at the proper conclusion regarding LDS's spe-
cial warranty deed. The court should have concluded that LDS
warranted only the title to the property with its special warranty
deed.
V. EFFECTS OF THE DECISION ON CONVEYANCING IN MONTANA
A. Economic Effects
As a result of the arbitrary interpretation of the warranty deed
in Wagner, conveyancing in Montana may be affected in several
ways. Primarily, because this decision may affect any deed that
contains the word "warrant," conveyancers may be insecure in us-
ing a warranty deed. An increase in the use of quitclaim deeds in
89. Id. at 226, 570 P.2d at 296.
90. 127 Mont. 39, 257 P.2d 249 (1953)(Plaintiff conveyed property by a warranty deed
which contained the word "grant." Defendant (buyer) counterclaimed against plaintiff
(seller) because taxes were outstanding on the property, a violation of the covenant against
encumbrances.).
91. Unfortunately, Wagner is not unique in Montana judicial history. The Montana
Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted a title covenant statute in Simonson v. McDonald,
131 Mont. 494, 311 P.2d 982 (1957). In Simonson, plaintiffs brought an action to establish a
right of way by necessity over the defendants' property. Plaintiffs contended the right of
way was reserved by implication at the time of the original conveyance from the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company. Id. at 495-96, 311 P.2d at 982-83. Because the REVISED CODES OF
MONTANA § 67-1616 (1947)(currently codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-304 (1989)) pro-
vided that from the use of the word "grant" in a conveyance of real property two covenants,
and no others, on the part of the grantor were implied. The court held that the statute
abolished all other implied covenants. Fortunately, the Montana Supreme Court, in Thisted
v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 103, 405 P.2d 432, 440 (1965), expressly over-
ruled Simonson and stated that "implied reservations or implied grants of easement by
necessity" exist in Montana.
In Simonson, the court confused implied covenants of title with implied easements. In
Wagner, the court confused implied covenants of title with implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose or of merchantability. While implied easements and implied warranties
of condition of the property are clearly different, neither is one of the six recognized cove-
nants of title. See supra note 42. The Simonson court excluded implied easements because
they were not statutorily identified covenants of title. In Wagner, the court invented a new
covenant of title for inclusion in LDS's special warranty deed. 14
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the conveyance of real property may issue. Quitclaim deeds, how-
ever, offer no title protection to a grantee;"2 therefore, their use
could result in added expense. Grantors may receive a reduced
price as a result of not providing title covenants. Grantees would
have to provide their own defense if later required to defend their
title to the property.
Another alternative for conveyancers may be the use of indi-
vidually drafted warranty deeds. Although buyers and sellers of
real property should retain counsel, a lawyer's drafting of an indi-
vidual deed may raise the cost of a property conveyance substan-
tially. For example, an attorney seeking to embody the parties' in-
tent may be forced to draft an excessively lengthy and complex
deed. These individually drafted deeds may be advantageous if liti-
gation results because there would be no question as to the parties'
intent. However, such deeds would lack the simplicity of form
deeds. Moreover, the general public may find these lengthy deeds
even more confusing than the presently used form deeds. There-
fore, widespread use of complex, individually drafted warranty
deeds would be undesirable, both economically and practically.
B. Previously Executed Deeds
Wagner also raises a question about the interpretation of
deeds containing the word "warrant" that have already been exe-
cuted. Does this decision signify that grantors warranted the con-
dition of properties conveyed in the past with such deeds? If so,
for what length of time does the warranty extend? Currently, these
questions cannot be answered. However, if the answers are affirma-
tive, Wagner will have produced property law chaos.
C. Attorney Guidelines to Avoid a Similar Result
Wagner should alert lawyers practicing in Montana to several
details when preparing documents of conveyance. First, society is
increasingly mobile. Many transactions occur between residents of
different states. Clients should not use or accept out-of-state statu-
tory form warranty deeds in property conveyances within the state
of Montana. Next, if litigation occurs because of a deed, attorneys
should check the origin of the deed. If the deed originated from
outside the state, the statute of that state should be pleaded ac-
cording to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 9(d). Finally, while
Wagner remains good law in Montana, attorneys should use the
92. "A quitclaim deed contains no warranties of any kind." J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER,
PROPERTY 646 (2d ed. 1988).
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word "warrant" in a deed cautiously. Through careful drafting, an
attorney should be able to warrant only the title to the property. A
phrase such as "warrant only the title to the property" in a deed
may state clearly the intentions of the conveyor. Imprecise drafting
of a warranty deed, however, may lead to undesirable results. For
example, a grantor may intend to provide a warranty of title, but
instead may warrant the condition of the property. Attorneys also
should survey carefully the wording in the common form books in
Montana. "Warrant" should be used only in conjunction with "the
title" before using the published form. Paying extra attention to
details should allow the Montana conveyancer to avoid the pitfalls
the court created with its novel interpretation of "warrant" in
Wagner.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, warranty deeds have not warranted the condition
of real property. In Wagner, however, the Montana Supreme Court
compromised centuries of black-letter law by interpreting a special
warranty deed as warranting the condition of real property. This
holding is unfortunate because it introduces uncertainty into war-
ranty deeds which, until now, purported to warrant only the title
to the property.
While a deed transferring real property is a contract subject to
contract-interpretation statutes, the correct interpretation of a
deed often depends upon the use of appropriate definitions of con-
veyancing terms, such as "warrant." Furthermore, because of stat-
utory provisions governing deeds, strict contract analysis may also
fail. In Wagner, the document was a statutory short-form warranty
deed with a precise meaning in the State of Utah. The court
should have interpreted the deed first as a conveyancing docu-
ment, and then as a Utah statutory short-form deed. If the court
had interpreted the special warranty deed as merely a conveyanc-
ing document, it would have construed the deed as one in which
the grantor warranted only good, clear title. Then, recognizing the
deed as a Utah statutory form warranty deed, the court should
have determined that the Utah statute provided all the covenants
of title contained in the deed.
This novel interpretation of the LDS special warranty deed
should concern lawyers practicing in Montana today. Attorneys
should take care that any warranty deeds used to convey property
specifically express what is warranted by the deed; otherwise, un-
witting conveyors may warrant more than they intend to warrant.
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